1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT				
2	DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO				
3	In Re: ) Docket No. 3:17-BK-3283(LTS)				
4	) ) PROMESA Title III				
5	The Financial Oversight and ) Management Board for )				
6	Puerto Rico, (Jointly Administered)				
7	as representative of )				
8	The Commonwealth of ) Puerto Rico, et al. ) June 29, 2022				
9	)				
10	Debtors, )				
11					
12	In Re: ) Docket No. 3:17-BK-4780(LTS)				
13	) PROMESA Title III				
14	The Financial Oversight and ) Management Board for )				
15	Puerto Rico, ) (Jointly Administered)				
16	as representative of ) )				
17	The Puerto Rico Electric ) Power Authority, )				
18	) Debtors, )				
19					
20	OMNIBUS HEARING				
21	BEFORE THE HONORABLE U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN				
22	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE				
23	AND THE HONORABLE U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE JUDITH GAIL DEIN				
24	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE				
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1	APPEARANCES:					
2						
3	ALL PARTIES APPEARING VIA VIDEOCONFERENCE OR TELEPHONICALLY					
4		Martin J. Bienenstock, PHV Brian S. Rosen, PHV				
5	Ms Mr.	Laura Stafford, PHV Scott P. Cooper, PHV				
6		Daniel Desatnik, PHV				
7	For Puerto Rico Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority: Ms	Carolina Velaz-Rivero, Esq.				
9	For Isla Del Rio, Inc.: Mr	Eduardo Capdevila, Esq.				
10	For PV Properties: Mr.	Fernando E. Agrait, Esq.				
11	For Cobra Acquisitions,	This Course his Diffe				
12	LLC: Mr.	Abid Qureshi, PHV				
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San Juan, Puerto Rico 1 2 June 29, 2022 At or about 9:34 AM 3 4 THE COURT: Good morning. This is Judge Swain 5 speaking. 6 7 Ms. Tacoronte, would you please call the case? COURTROOM DEPUTY: Good morning, Your Honor. 8 In re: The Financial -- I'm sorry, Your Honor. 9 The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico 10 is now in session. 11 12 THE COURT: Your sound is fading out a little bit, Ms. Tacoronte. 13 COURTROOM DEPUTY: I'm sorry, Your Honor. Is this 14 better? 15 THE COURT: Yes, it is, much better. Thank you. 16 COURTROOM DEPUTY: Okay. The United States District 17 Court for the District of Puerto Rico is now in session. The 18 Honorable Laura Taylor Swain presiding. Also sitting, 19 Honorable Magistrate Judge Judith Dein. God save the United 20 States of America and this Honorable Court. 21 In re: The Financial Oversight and Management Board 22 2.3 for Puerto Rico, as representative of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, et al., Case No. 2017-BK-3283, and In re: The 2.4 Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico as 25

representative of the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, Case No. 2017-BK-4780, for Omnibus Hearing.

THE COURT: Thank you.

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Buenos dias. Counsel who are participating by Zoom, please turn your cameras on for these introductory remarks and instructions, but keep your microphones muted.

Welcome, counsel, parties in interest, and members of the public, and press. To ensure the orderly operation of today's virtual hearing once we turn to our agenda items, all parties appearing by Zoom must mute their microphones when they're not speaking, and turn off their video cameras if they are not directly involved in the presentation or argument. When you need to speak, you must turn your camera on and unmute your microphone on the Zoom screen.

I remind everyone that consistent with court and Judicial Conference policies and the orders that have been issued, no recording or retransmission of the hearing is permitted by anyone, including but not limited to the parties, members of the public, and members of the press. Violations of this rule may be punished with sanctions.

I will be calling on each speaker during the proceeding. When I do, please turn your camera on, unmute yourself, and identify yourself by name for clarity of the record. After the speakers listed on the agenda for each of today's matters have spoken, I may permit other parties in

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interest to address briefly any issues raised during the presentations that require further remarks. If you want to be heard under these circumstances, please use the "raise hand" feature of Zoom at the appropriate time, and that can be accessed by selecting the reactions icon in the tool bar located at the bottom of your Zoom screen. I'll then call on the speakers one by one. If you've raised your hand, when you're finished, please use the "lower hand" feature in that reactions tool bar.

Please don't interrupt each other or me during the hearing. If we interrupt each other, it's difficult to create an accurate transcript. But having said that, and as usual, I apologize in advance for breaking this rule as I may interrupt if I have questions or if you go beyond your allotted time. If anyone has difficulty hearing me or another participant at any time, please use the "raise hand" feature immediately.

The agenda, which was filed as Docket Entry No. 21368 in Case No. 17-3283 is available to the public at no cost on Prime Clerk for those who are interested. Although Prime Clerk is now known as Kroll Restructuring Administration, the Prime Clerk website addresses and telephone numbers are still operational.

I encourage each speaker to keep track of his or her own time. The Court will also be keeping track of the time, and will alert each speaker when there are two minutes

remaining with one buzz, and, when time is up, with two buzzes. If you're speaking for three minutes or less, you'll only hear the final two buzzes. Here's an example of the buzz sound.

I think our buzzer extraordinaire needs to unmute.
(Sound played.)

THE COURT: That's very faint. Can you hold that any closer to your microphone?

(Sound played.)

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THE COURT: It's still very faint, so I will listen carefully for it, and, counsel, as I said, please keep track of your own time. I will also make an effort to keep track of the time.

This morning we will proceed until 12:50. In the unlikely event that we need to resume for the afternoon, we will resume from 2:10 to 5:00 PM. If we need to take a break, I will announce that, and the telephone listen-in-only participants who are on the AT&T line should keep that line open and not hang the phone up during the break.

Please turn your cameras off now, and turn your camera back on when we reach your agenda item or if I call on you.

The first agenda item is, as usual, status reports from the Oversight Board and AAFAF. As requested in the Procedures Order, these reports have been made in writing in

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advance of this virtual hearing, and are available on the public docket at Docket Entry Nos. 21376 and 21377 in Case No. 17-3283, respectively. I thank the Oversight Board and AAFAF for the care and detail reflected in their reports, which, as always, are informative and cover important matters. I'll first call on counsel for the Oversight Board for any comments in addition to the written report. MR. BIENENSTOCK: Thank you, Judge Swain. Martin Bienenstock of Proskauer Rose, LLP, for the Oversight Board. The Board doesn't have additional comments this morning, Your Honor. Thank you, and good morning, THE COURT: Mr. Bienenstock. I do have one question for you. Your report indicates that the timetable for the PFC Title VI has shifted because of a disagreement about certain elements, and so my question for you is whether and to what extent there is a new timetable, and whether there is active engagement in an effort to resolve that dispute? MR. BIENENSTOCK: Your Honor, I see my partner, Mr. Rosen, has opened his video, and if it's okay, I will defer to Mr. Rosen to answer that. THE COURT: Certainly. Good morning, Mr. Rosen. MR. ROSEN: Good morning, Your Honor. Thank you very Brian Rosen, Proskauer Rose, on behalf of the Oversight Board.

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Yes, Your Honor. We had indicated in our prior status report that we thought that we would be able to file the qualifying modification by June 17. One component of that understanding was the issuance of certain additional bonds, excuse me, in connection with DRA. As reflected in this status report, Your Honor, there is an ongoing discussion among AAFAF, actually, the Oversight Board as well, the DRA Collateral Monitor, as well as the U.S. Trus -- excuse me, the U.S. Bank Trustee, on behalf of certain noteholders, concerning the amount of those bonds that will be issued.

We thought that there was an understanding way back in November, Your Honor, when the understanding was announced by counsel for U.S. Bank. However, it continues. There is active engagement among the parties, although I cannot tell you a specific timetable at this point in time. The parties are still quite far apart, and we're still trying to engage all in the discussions to see if an agreement can be reached, but nothing at this time.

THE COURT: All right. Let's see. Our next Omni and next regular status report is not until August, and so do you expect to be sufficiently engaged that you would be in a position to file a status report that would be informative and useful by August 1st?

MR. ROSEN: Your Honor, I think we will certainly

have an update by that point in time that we could report back to the Court as to the progress that has been made, yes.

THE COURT: Very well then. I am directing you to file a status report on PFC by August 1st. Thank you very much.

MR. ROSEN: Your Honor, if I could take one more second to update the Court on one item?

THE COURT: Yes.

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MR. ROSEN: There was an EMMA filing with respect to this, but I would like to let the Court know about this as well. In connection with the Commonwealth Plan, Your Honor, there was something that was referred to as distribution conditions, with respect to the distribution of certain monies and CVI for HTA holders, and that would be pursuant to the Commonwealth Plan.

At the time of the effective date, Your Honor, the distribution conditions had not been satisfied. We're happy to report that the -- those conditions have been satisfied now. And, Your Honor, specifically, what they were was the documentation of the HTA Plan, which, as you know, is on file, a draft confirmation order, which the parties agreed to at this point in form, as well as the terms of a new HTA bond indenture.

With that being concluded, Your Honor, we have filed this EMMA notice with AAFAF to reflect that, and distributions

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will be made in accordance with the terms of the HTA-CCDA Plan Support Agreement. That will provide considerable distributions to holders of HTA bonds, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. MR. ROSEN: You're welcome, Your Honor. THE COURT: I have no further questions for the Oversight Board. Does anyone else have any questions or comments in relation to the Oversight Board report? If so, please raise your hand. I see no hands raised, and so I'll call on counsel for AAFAF for any comments in addition to the report. MS. VELAZ-RIVERO: Good morning, Your Honor. Carolina Velaz-Rivero from Marini Pietrantoni Muniz on behalf of AAFAF. THE COURT: Good morning. MS. VELAZ-RIVERO: Good morning. We don't have any additional comments to what we included in the report. Thank you. THE COURT: Are there any further comments or questions in connection with AAFAF's report? If so, please raise your hand. I see no further hands raised, so thank you very much, Ms. Velaz-Rivero. We will now go on to the next agenda item in Section

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II of the agenda, which is contested matters. The first such matter is the 458th Omnibus Objection to claims, and I have the Oversight Board as the sole speaker with respect to that objection for five minutes.

MS. STAFFORD: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor. This is Laura Stafford of Proskauer Rose on behalf of the Oversight Board.

As Your Honor mentioned, the first contested matter or contested Omnibus Claim Objection is the 458th Omnibus Claim Objection, which was filed at ECF No. 20789, and seeks to reclassify proofs of claim that incorrectly or improperly assert entitlement to priority or secured status.

Only one response to this objection was timely filed, and it was filed by two entities related to Ferrovial Agroman, Ferrovial Agroman, LLC, and Ferrovial Agroman, SA. It addresses Proof of Claim Nos. 24230 and 17738, and was filed at ECF No. 21159. Each of these claims assert liabilities associated with construction projects initiated by HTA, and claim to be secured under budget of federal funds.

I'm pleased to report that we conferred with counsel for Ferrovial Agroman -- for both Ferrovial Agroman entities with respect to these proofs of claim, and the parties have reached agreement with respect to the results of this Omnibus Objection. We've agreed that the Ferrovial entities do not oppose the relief requested as to either proof of claim, which

would be reclassified in these proofs of claim as general unsecured claims in their entirety. Ferrovial reserves its rights to amend its claims, and the debtors reserve their rights to object to the claims on any other grounds whatsoever. And for that reason, Your Honor, we'd request the Court sustain the 458th Omnibus Objection, and disallow -- I apologize, reclassify the Ferrovial Agroman claims, notwithstanding the response.

THE COURT: Thank you.

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Having reviewed the submission and heard the remarks of counsel this morning regarding the agreement, the Court rules as follows: The 458th Omnibus Objection is sustained as to Proof of Claim No. 24320 filed by Ferrovial Agroman, LLC, against the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority, and Proof of Claim No. 17738 filed by Ferrovial Agroman, SA, against the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority. The portions of those claims that are currently classified as secured are reclassified as general unsecured claims. The claimant has failed to identify any prima facie factual or legal basis supporting the assertion that the claims are secured.

I ask that counsel for the Oversight Board submit a comprehensive proposed order resolving all matters raised in the 458th Omnibus Objection.

MS. STAFFORD: We will do so, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Stafford.

The next contested matter is the 468th Omnibus

Objection to claims. That is Docket Entry No. 20799 in Case

No. 17-3283. I have as the first speaker on this objection

the Oversight Board for three minutes, followed by counsel for

Isla Del Rio, Inc., for five minutes, and then with a reply.

So, Ms. Stafford.

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MS. STAFFORD: Thank you very much, Your Honor.

This 468th Omnibus Objection seeks to disallow in their entirety certain proofs of claim that were subsequently amended and superseded by additional proofs of claim filed by the claimant -- as subsequently filed by the claimant. Only one response to this objection was timely received as well, and it was filed by Isla Del Rio with respect to Proof of Claim No. 11464 at ECF No. 21296.

Isla filed an initial proof of claim, Proof of Claim No. 11464, on May 8th, 2018, asserting liabilities associated with pending litigations between PREPA and Isla. Isla then filed a second proof of claim on March 10th of 2022, which was docketed by Kroll as Proof of Claim No. 179740. That second proof of claim purports to amend the first proof of claim, and asserts the same pending litigations between PREPA and Isla, but with a higher claim amount, and with the addition of additional supporting documentation relating to evaluation reports submitted in connection with the litigations.

Isla's response acknowledges that the objection is correct, and that Proof of Claim No. 179740 was intended to amend Proof of Claim No. 11464. Because Isla does not dispute that Proof of Claim No. 179740 amends Proof of Claim No. 11464, PREPA requests the Court grant the objection and disallow Proof of Claim No. 11464. Isla will not be prejudiced by this, because it will retain Proof of Claim No. 17974 against PREPA, which asserts the same litigation at an increased amount.

Thank you, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Thank you. Just a question. Is the second one Claim No. 179740 or 17974?

MS. STAFFORD: I apologize, Your Honor. 179740.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Does counsel for Isla Del Rio wish to be heard?

MR. CAPDEVILA-DIAZ: Good morning, Your Honor. For the record, Eduardo Capdevila on behalf of Isla Del Rio.

What Counsel Stafford just said is correct. My client accidentally -- he filed a duplicate claim, instead of amending it. To that end, while we apologize to the Court and the Board for the mistake, I just want to add that the stay was lifted to liquidate this claim to judgment, and as soon as it is reduced to judgment in state court, as allowed by this Court on Docket 3795, our client will amend the claim, correctly this time may I add.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Capdevila. 1 2 Ms. Stafford, any further comments? MS. STAFFORD: No, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: Thank you. 4 MR. CAPDEVILA-DIAZ: Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: Mr. Capdevila, yes. 6 7 MR. CAPDEVILA-DIAZ: Your Honor, yes. That's the only matter for my client. May I be excused from the hearing? 8 THE COURT: Let me just rule, and then you can be 9 excused. 10 MR. CAPDEVILA-DIAZ: Okay. 11 THE COURT: So this is my ruling: The 468th Omnibus 12 Objection is sustained as to Proof of Claim No. 14464 filed by 13 Isla Del Rio, Inc., against the Puerto Rico Electric Power 14 Authority. The claim shall be disallowed in its entirety, 15 because it has been amended and superseded by Proof of Claim 16 No. 179740, also filed against PREPA, which is recognized as 17 an active claim to which no objection is currently pending. 18 The debtor is directed to submit a comprehensive 19 proposed order resolving all matters raised in the 468th 20 Omnibus Objection. That concludes my ruling. Thank you, 21 Counsel. 22 2.3 Mr. Capdevila, you are excused. Thank you. MS. STAFFORD: Thank you, Your Honor. 2.4 25 THE COURT: The next matter on today's agenda is

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contested matter no. 3, which is the Cobra Lift Stay of Litigation of Administrative Expense Claim Motion. speaking first for eight minutes Mr. Qureshi for Cobra. Good morning, Mr. Qureshi. MR. QURESHI: Good morning, Your Honor. THE COURT: Good morning. MR. QURESHI: Your Honor, for the record, Abid Qureshi of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld on behalf of Cobra. May I proceed? THE COURT: Yes, you may. MR. QURESHI: Thank you, Your Honor. Your Honor, we are back yet again in an attempt to lift a stay that has now been in place for almost three years. Your Honor, before I get into the factual details to explain why the interests of justice now demand that that stay be lifted, I want to start with revisiting the legal standard, and, in particular, Your Honor, with the words of the Supreme Court in the Landis decision, which we cite in our papers. that case, the Court said that, in exercising its discretion to impose a stay, a court must, quote, weigh competing interests and maintain an even balance. Additionally, Your Honor, and very relevant for today's purposes, the Supreme Court in that same ruling cautioned against what it termed an immoderate stay without

reasonable limits, and it instructed that once those limits

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have been reached, quote, the fetters should fall off. And that, Your Honor, respectfully, is where we are today.

There is no further justification for the stay, so let's look at what the justifications have, in fact, been.

Just to remind Your Honor of the timeline, Cobra completed its restoration work in March of 2019. The last payment it received was in May of 2019. In September of 2019, Cobra's former president, along with two FEMA officials, was indicted. That same month, Cobra filed its administrative expense claim.

Now, when the government parties first moved to stay the admin claims motion, they looked for what they call the limited stay, and they pointed to the criminal indictment. What they said was that PREPA might have been fraudulently induced to enter into the contract. They further said that PREPA might have a, quote, unquote, complete defense to Cobra's claim, and even that they, PREPA, may have claims against Cobra for disgorgement or damages. They argued that discovery duplicative with the criminal proceeding would be unnecessary, and they argued that whether the contracts, the Cobra contracts were procured or effected by bribery or fraud would be relevant to their obligation to pay.

Now, when Your Honor granted that motion in October of '19, Your Honor stated that significant factual, legal questions that could bear upon the motion would likely be addressed in the criminal matter. Your Honor also noted that

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the criminal indictment related to the same contracts that were at issue in the administrative claims motion.

So, Your Honor, fast forward six months from that initial stay, and Cobra came back before this Court to seek limited relief, which was payment on undisputed taxes that Cobra paid to the Commonwealth, and for which it has a contractual reimbursement right. That motion, too, was denied. And again, Your Honor, the government parties in opposing it pointed to the criminal proceedings, and they said that if the allegations in the Indictment were proven at trial, it might be a complete or a partial defense to Cobra.

Fast forward once again, Your Honor, to August of 2021, and we again moved to lift the stay. And if -- this time the justification had been further delay in that criminal trial, and, again, it was the criminal trial that was -- that was pointed to. And Your Honor, in denying that motion, ruled that there were not sufficient changes that warranted lifting the stay.

Well, now, Your Honor, we believe that there have been. The criminal matter is over. Plea agreements have been entered. The only step that remains in the criminal matter, Your Honor, is a sentencing hearing, which is scheduled to occur on August the 17th.

In the Plea Agreement that was filed with and accepted by the Court, Your Honor, there is a stipulation of

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facts, and we filed that stipulation and that plea agreement as an exhibit to our motion. And that establishes, Your Honor, certain uncontroverted and important facts.

First of all, Mr. Ellison, the former Cobra president that was indicted, engaged in conduct that was entirely unrelated to the two contracts that are at issue in the admin claims motion. Instead, his conduct related to a contract that Cobra was never awarded, and work that Cobra never performed.

Now, despite PREPA's wishes that he was convicted of bribery, which they state repeatedly in their opposition, he was not. In fact, Your Honor, the bribery count was dismissed as part of the Plea Agreement. What he plead guilty to was a gratuity, which consisted of approximately \$8,000 in hotel, airfare, and security expenses that he paid on behalf of a FEMA official. That's it, Your Honor.

entirely irrelevant to whether Cobra has an allowed administrative claim or not. If PREPA wishes to argue, Your Honor, that it is relevant, they are free to do so. There is nothing about a lifting of the stay that takes away from PREPA the ability to argue whatever it wishes with respect to that criminal plea agreement, but, Your Honor, as the First Circuit has made clear, the government parties do bear a heavy burden to demonstrate that there is a clear case of hardship that

they would suffer absent the stay, and they can't do that.

So moving on to the second justification that to varying degrees we have heard over time, that is, FEMA's ongoing contract review, and with respect to that, Your Honor, first, it was PREPA and not FEMA --

(Sound played.)

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MR. QURESHI: -- that agreed to the terms of the contract. They did so after multiple levels of review, and of course with the benefit of legal advice.

Your Honor, Cobra does not have standing before FEMA. It's not part of the FEMA review process. The contracts that are at issue in the admin claims motion, they raise FEMA, Your Honor, in only one respect, and that is that PREPA could be relieved of its obligation to pay only if PREPA fails to receive federal funding due to Cobra's, quote, unquote, sole fault. That's not even alleged here, Your Honor.

So PREPA says that the outcome of the FEMA review, it might give to PREPA a material defense to the administrative claims motion, and they variously assert that FEMA will issue its determinations with respect to the second contract in one case, quote, unquote, soon, and in another case, by the end of the year. We have history to guide us with respect to those deadlines, Your Honor. And so --

THE COURT: Mr. Qureshi.

MR. QURESHI: Yes.

THE COURT: I'd like to just interrupt you now.

MR. QURESHI: Please.

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THE COURT: As to the FEMA review of the first contract, it seems to me from reading the submissions that the Oversight Board is no longer raising the sort of granular, too many hours, not enough people on site, those sort of objections that it had said would need to be the subject of extensive discovery and litigation, and the Oversight Board seems to be accepting the claims, or at least the quantification of the claims as — to the extent they have been approved by FEMA. At this point, there is 22 million that are still in dispute that I understand has to do with taxes. And there's a mechanism for working on it, but it does seem to me that progress was made, and litigation of a lot of details was avoided by letting FEMA take the first pass through the first contract.

Is that understanding unfounded?

MR. QURESHI: It is not unfounded, Your Honor, but there is one very material thing that Your Honor left out, and that is that Cobra has already been paid with respect to the first contract. What is at issue is almost entirely amounts owing with respect to the second contract, and also with respect to interest that continues to accrue.

So while it is correct, Your Honor, that of course PREPA would have the ability to object to amounts that it had

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previously paid with respect to the first contract, and PREPA appears with respect to the first contract to not be taking that position, in light of FEMA's review, it is really the second contract that is the higher priority item for Cobra, Your Honor, for the simple and obvious reason that we have not been paid on that contract.

THE COURT: Is there any reason sitting here to think that PREPA would not back off the technical objections to amounts approved by FEMA, and that FEMA, in fact, has approved substantial amounts for related work under the first contract?

MR. QURESHI: So, Your Honor, my understanding is that PREPA has assured us, albeit I don't believe in a pleading, but my understanding is that PREPA has assured us that whatever amounts PREPA actually receives from FEMA, on account of the work that Cobra has performed, whether with respect to the first or the second contract, PREPA intends to pay those amounts over to Cobra. So that is certainly the understanding.

Your Honor, the diff -- and additionally, Your Honor could well be correct, and I would certainly hope that it would be the case, that if, in fact, on whatever timeline FEMA is operating under FEMA ultimately approves the invoices that are the subject of the second contract, and ultimately releases those funds to PREPA, that PREPA will, in fact, turn

that money over to Cobra to satisfy the claim. That is certainly our expectation.

The reason, Your Honor, that we continue to implore this Court to lift the stay is that Cobra is -- or PREPA, I should say, has no contractual entitlement to defer dealing with Cobra until FEMA has finished its process. Remember that the way this works under the --

(Sound played.)

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MR. QURESHI: -- first contract, Your Honor, is that Cobra performed the work, Cobra submitted invoices, PREPA paid those invoices, and then, after the fact, PREPA sought reimbursement from FEMA. And then PREPA stopped paying those invoices.

Now, they say that that was because FEMA said, as a result of the criminal matter, it was no longer going to reimburse it, although there's a timing disconnect in that regard, but fundamentally, Your Honor, the case remains that the basis of the administrative claim that Cobra has filed is its contract with PREPA.

The legal standard that Your Honor must determine, in terms of whether that is an allowed administrative claim, has nothing whatsoever to do with FEMA and whatever process FEMA is engaging in. If PREPA wants to point to a FEMA disallowance and independently try to establish that as a basis to disallow a portion of the administrative claim, they

are allowed to do so, but, Your Honor, what Cobra did not bargain for and what PREPA did not get contractual rights with respect to is to bring FEMA into this process, and to put on PREPA -- I apologize, Your Honor, to put on Cobra the entire risk with respect to both the timing and the outcome of the FEMA process.

And we know --

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THE COURT: Well, Mr. --

MR. QURESHI: Sorry.

THE COURT: Sorry. Mr. Qureshi, I think I do understand your point with respect to the contractual relationships and the role of FEMA, as well as the genuine I'll call it disadvantage to which your client has been put by these delays. This litigation stay, however, is imposed and these issues exist within the context of a Title III proceeding in which there remains an automatic stay.

There is Section 305 of PROMESA, which prevents the Court from ordering the government entity to make a payment without the consent of the Oversight Board, and the provisions with respect to payment of administrative expenses are tied to plan confirmation. So while in the ordinary course, with a litigation stay, as you say, there is a weighing of disadvantage to both parties with respect to the delay of progress toward the end goal of the litigation, and there remains that sort of weighing in the determination, on this

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stay here, we have the practical situation that PREPA is not, in the Title III context, required to make the payment to your client until there is a confirmation proceeding to the extent it's going to be paid as an administrative claim.

So here PREPA raises an efficiency point of view that seems to have played out in connection with the first contract, which is that PREPA is certainly saved time and transaction costs of litigating contract-based objections that may well go away if PREPA's comfortable that it's going to be paid by FEMA, and PREPA has legal protection from having to front the money before confirmation. So in that context, what is there to be gained that would benefit the debtor, PREPA, quite frankly, in litigating the granular contract objections before FEMA makes its evaluation?

MR. QURESHI: So a couple of things, Your Honor.

First of all, I don't think the primary analysis should be what is the benefit to PREPA. I think, instead, it should be, and the case law requires that it be, what is the prejudice to Cobra. While Your Honor is correct that payment may not be required until the time of confirmation of a plan, Your Honor should not conflate payment with allowability of the claim.

Cobra is substantially prejudiced when it does not even have an allowed administrative claim.

Given the size of the claim, in excess of 300 million dollars, inclusive of interest that continues to accrue, Your

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Honor, this has had very real and very severe financial consequences on Cobra. The allowance of the claim, even if payment were not to occur until we get to confirmation, would itself be very significant in relieving some of the harm that Cobra has suffered as a result of the stay.

In addition, Your Honor, and this now does come into play in terms of benefit to PREPA, and in fact to all of the constituents involved in these proceedings, given the size of the claim, it will be a litigated issue at confirmation proceedings with respect to the ability, the financial ability of PREPA to satisfy the claim, and, therefore, the feasibility of whatever plan may be proposed.

PREPA benefits, and all of the parties in this proceeding benefit from certainty, certainty as to what the allowed amount of that claim is, so everybody knows how much funding PREPA needs to have available in order to satisfy the claim at the time of confirmation.

In addition, Your Honor, to the extent that PREPA, if that claim were to be allowed prior to confirmation, pays any portion of it, the interest clock would stop ticking, and the estate would be relieved of the burden of ongoing interest expense.

Finally, in responding to Your Honor's question, I would point to the fact -- and, by the way, in the First Circuit's list of seven factors that are relevant in this type

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of a proceeding, this is one of them. Your Honor, there's a very important public interest at stake here, and that is that the whole point of granting an administrative priority is so that parties like Cobra are willing to step in and provide services to an estate. And let's not forget the circumstances in which that occurred here.

There was no power on the island, Your Honor, and Cobra stepped in under extremely difficult circumstances. And we are not talking about Cobra being before the Court merely to seek its profit. We're talking about hundreds of millions of dollars that was paid out by Cobra to employees on account of taxes for workers, for materials, and the like.

The policy consideration of making sure that parties in other cases are incentivized to provide a debtor with those types of services under those circumstances is a very important one. If every administrative creditor received the treatment that Cobra has received here, where they are precluded even from seeking allowance of the claim for work, the substance of which is not subject to any serious dispute, Your Honor, those policy considerations would be undermined. And so I would urge the Court to come back to that list of factors that the First Circuit instructs should be considered, because every single one of them weighs in favor of lifting the stay, so that at least we can get to the point where Cobra has an allowed claim.

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And, Your Honor, the argument that there will be duplicative discovery, these vaque notions that FEMA -- that PREPA points to, they need to do more than that to allow the stay to continue, and they haven't done it. The reality is that Cobra, at its own expense, has responded to all of the information requests. We know, although we don't see it, tons of information has been provided to FEMA. That's all information that PREPA has access to. So I doubt very much that extensive discovery is even This is really about PREPA saying they would prefer needed. to sit here and wait for FEMA to issue its ruling, whether that happens in six months, or one year, or two years, and that's just not fair. It's contrary to the considerations that the First Circuit lays out. It's not provided for in the contract. And respectfully, Your Honor, this Court should not allow it. Thank you, Mr. Qureshi. THE COURT: MR. QURESHI: Thank you. THE COURT: I'll now turn to counsel for the Oversight Board. MR. COOPER: Good morning, Your Honor. Scott Cooper of Proskauer Rose, LLP, counsel for the Oversight Board as representative of PREPA. THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. COOPER: Your Honor, I think Mr. Qureshi has the

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standard here backward. Each of the arguments, save the development of the entry of the felony quilty pleas by Cobra's former president and FEMA's former on-island representative, is the only new event since the Court has previously ruled on essentially every argument that Cobra has offered this morning. And as your exchange with Cobra has already reflected during this argument, the reasons for the continuation of the stay are grounded primarily on the fact that there is efficiency to be gained, and nothing essentially from a legal standpoint to be lost, by allowing the FEMA review of the second contract to continue and be completed before the parties attempt to join the issue on whether there are any -- after that process completes, any remaining issues to be litigated in this Court regarding the amounts still arguably due to Cobra. And for those reasons, the stay should be continued.

We do not believe that the entry of the felony guilty pleas in criminal actions are a sufficient basis, indeed any justification, for a modification of the stay. And since no other events have occurred that justify a change in the Court's prior reasons for continuing the stay, we submit it should be continued.

Cobra's attempt to portray the entry of the criminal pleas as exonerating of Cobra and as sufficient basis for the modification of the stay is inaccurate in our view. Indeed,

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Cobra places more importance on the continuing relevance of the criminal proceedings than the government parties did in their objection. The status of the criminal proceeding has not been the sole basis on which the Court has premised the stay in the past, and we don't believe it is the primary basis for the continuation of the stay now.

We also believe that Cobra's characterization of the felony quilty pleas is not entirely accurate, but I think it's unnecessary, unless the Court has an interest and -- in understanding more of the details. I think it's all covered in our papers. I won't go into detail about exactly what the pleas were or about what the factual basis was. Suffice to say that they establish, on a stipulated basis, that Mr. Ellison and Ms. Tribble engaged in criminal conduct, at least from April 2018 through December of 2018, the same time period during which the second contract was being negotiated, executed, and performed by Cobra. And while it is true that the conduct that is being stipulated to was not directly related to the second contract, it could be relevant to FEMA's review of the second contract. But, more importantly, it simply isn't a basis for the lifting of the stay.

Even Cobra admits the issues being addressed by the FEMA contract review overlap substantially with what Cobra asks the Court to address. FEMA is engaged in an extensive, detailed analysis of Cobra's contractual entitlement to

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payment based on a legal stand -- required under the Bankruptcy Code. FEMA reviews the corporate invoices --COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry, Counsel. Your Honor, this is the court reporter. If counsel could please repeat? The audio broke up from when he said "FEMA is engaged in an extensive detailed analysis" --THE COURT: Can you go back to that point, please, Mr. Cooper? MR. COOPER: Yes. Yes. THE COURT: Thank you. MR. COOPER: That FEMA is engaged in an extensive detailed analysis of Cobra's entitlement to payment based on a legal standard similar to the one required under the Bankruptcy Code. FEMA reviews the Cobra invoices to determine whether the costs were necessary and reasonable to accomplish the work properly and efficiently, and whether the claimed costs at issue were authorized under the contract pursuant to which they were incurred or can be directly tied to the performance of eligible work. Those are the standards applicable to FEMA's review under federal regulations, and the standards FEMA applied in its determination memorandum in its review of corporate invoices under the first contract, and will be the standards applied in its review under the second contract. That necessary and reasonable standard is very

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similar to the actual and necessary standard under Bankruptcy Code Section 503(b).

THE COURT: Mr. Cooper, how do you respond to Mr. Qureshi's argument that the First Circuit's litigation stay standard requires the Court to recognize and weigh heavily the practical effect on Cobra's business of the delay, even in determination as to whether the claim is allowed in its commercial dealings? So Mr. Qureshi is saying Cobra doesn't have the money, and that's a problem, but even if Cobra can't be forced to -- can't enforce collection of the money now, not even having an allowed claim affects it materially in its commercial dealings.

MR. COOPER: I think the first thing I'd say about that, Your Honor, is this is by no means the first time that argument has been raised to the Court, and it has been rejected in each of the instances in which it's been raised in the past.

Second, I would say that under the factors that are established in *Microfinancial*, *Inc.*, v. *Premier Holidays*International, Inc., the First Circuit 2004 case that we've previously cited to the Court, the relevant factors are the hardship to PREPA, the interests of Cobra in proceeding expeditiously, and the convenience of the Court.

I would submit that the -- the consensual advantage to Cobra of having an adjudicated amount that would be due to

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it at the time that the Title III proceeding is concluded does not outweigh the very significant disadvantages that the Court has already identified of duplicative litigation, potentially inconsistent outcomes, and warrant the kind of proceeding that Cobra proposes, again, and that the Court has previously rejected, on the same arguments, be conducted on a simultaneous basis.

It's not efficient. It's likely to cause the litigation -- unnecessary litigation here of issues that likely would be resolved if the FEMA review is completed instead in the first instance, and that's really been proven, Your Honor, by the outcome, as you've noted, of the first contract review by FEMA. We're now down to just an appeal process with respect to the last issues on that, and in -- those issues will be resolved before any issue could be resolved in this Court on the first contract.

We submit the same outcome should occur with respect to the second contract, and that the weighing of the benefits and costs should result in the same outcome here. That is, that the stay should be continued.

THE COURT: Thank you. Anything further?

MR. COOPER: Not from me, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

Mr. Qureshi, you have two minutes for your further response.

MR. QURESHI: Thank you, Your Honor.

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So, Your Honor, the arguments that the Court just heard about the similarity of whatever FEMA standard is being applied to the review of the invoices with the administrative claim standard might be interesting, Your Honor, but it is not legally relevant. So let me come back to what is legally relevant, which is the seven factor First Circuit test. And I want to quickly tick through those factors, the first of which is the interests of the plaintiff in proceeding expeditiously, including the avoidance of prejudice should there be a delay. There's been a three-year delay. I think we have more than established the prejudice to Cobra of not even having an allowed claim.

Second, hardship to the defendant. What you are hearing, Your Honor, is that what PREPA wants is the benefit of doing nothing while FEMA does whatever it is that FEMA does. But, Your Honor, they didn't contract for that. We had a negotiation. That negotiation resulted in a contract. That contract gave PREPA one out, and one out only with respect to FEMA, and that is, if they don't get FEMA money because of Cobra's, quote, unquote, sole fault. That's not at issue. So while it may be more convenient, and even less expensive for PREPA, it's not legally relevant, Your Honor.

Third point, third factor, convenience of both the civil and criminal courts, not relevant. Fourth factor, the

interest of third parties. I've already stated why every 1 2 third party in this proceeding would benefit from certainty of 3 having the claim go forward. Fifth factor, public interest. Again, I've talked about the important public interest, the 4 underlying administrative priority, and why it even exists. 5 Sixth factor, good faith of the litigants, not at issue. 6 7 Seventh factor, status of the case. Again, weighs in favor of doing this now --8 (Sound played.) 9 MR. QURESHI: -- so we don't have another litigated 10 confirmation issue. 11 Your Honor, the interests of justice overwhelmingly 12 weigh in favor of lifting the stay. Thank you. 13 THE COURT: Thank you. I will now make my oral 14 ruling. 15 Pending before the Court is the Motion to Lift the 16 Stay Order, which is Docket Entry No. 21145 in Case No. 17 17-3283 and Docket Entry No. 2841 in Case No. 17-480, which 18 I'll refer to as the "Lift Stay Motion," filed by Cobra 19 Acquisitions, LLC, which I'll refer to as "Cobra", as we have 20 been doing. 21 The Court has reviewed the relevant pleadings 22 carefully and listened carefully to today's arguments. 2.3 Court now makes its oral ruling as to the Lift Stay Motion, 2.4 25 and reserves the right to make non-substantive corrections in

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the transcript of the ruling. For the following reasons, the Lift Stay Motion is denied.

Cobra requests termination of the litigation stay imposed by the Court in October of 2019 and continued since that time so that the parties may litigate Cobra's administrative expense motion, which is Docket Entry No. 8789 in Case No. 17-3283. The Court originally imposed the litigation stay, which was requested by the government parties, based on its conclusions that factual and legal questions that could affect the outcome of the administrative expense motion would likely be addressed in connection with certain criminal proceedings against Cobra's former president, and that the then pending FEMA investigation could also affect the parties' rights and obligations with respect to the amounts for which Cobra seeks administrative expense treatment.

The power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants, *Landis v. North*American Corporation, 299 U.S. 248, 254, (1936).

As this Court noted in its order imposing the stay, federal courts possess the inherent power to stay proceedings for prudential reasons, and I refer you to Docket Entry No. 8886 in Case No. 17-3283, which was the first stay order.

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That order quoted *Microfinancial*, *Inc.*, *v. Premier Holidays International*, *Inc.*, 385 F.3d 72, 77 (1st Cir. 2004).

It follows from these principles that after imposition of a stay for prudential reasons, the Court retains the ability to modify or dissolve the stay. *Green v. Cosby*, 177 F. Supp. 3d 673, 681 (D. Mass. 2016). Such circumstances include material changes in the circumstances that the Court originally determined warranted the stay.

Cobra contends that such material changes have occurred. First, the criminal trial is no longer imminent, because certain defendants have entered into plea agreements with the prosecution, and the defendants, including Cobra's former president, are now awaiting sentencing. Second, Cobra characterizes the ongoing cost analysis and determination awaited from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, or FEMA, as incomplete, insofar as only the first of two contracts between Cobra and PREPA has been reviewed and a determination issued.

While Cobra acknowledges that an administrative appeal of the determination concerning the first contract remains ongoing, that administrative appeal does not appear to be a material issue to either party, but Cobra, in any event, asserts that further FEMA-related delay is unwarranted. Specifically, Cobra argues that it will be unduly prejudiced by continuation of the stay pending FEMA review of the second

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contract and any related appeals, because the ultimate resolution of the claim will require further litigation, and more immediately, that the continuing financial uncertainty for Cobra is harmful to its business interests.

The government parties argue that the outcome, including sentencing of the criminal matter, may be relevant to Cobra's entitlement to administrative expense treatment and to payment, and they emphasize that the stay should remain in place until a cost analysis and determination memo is issued by FEMA concerning the entirety of the second contract, asserting that the result of the memorandum concerning the review of the first contract demonstrates the utility of such FEMA scrutiny in that issues that might well have been litigated in terms of contractual entitlement were essentially mooted by the -- by FEMA's approval of expenses. So the government argues that the FEMA cost analysis mitigates the need for costly discovery and motion practice.

The Court has considered these arguments carefully.

This Court previously held that adjournment of the criminal trial did not justify modification of the stay orders. See In re: Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico, 617 B.R. 173, 180, (D.P.R. 2020).

Here, the Plea Agreement shows substantial progress toward a resolution, but there is still contentions that the resolution may be significant to party positions in litigating

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certain aspects of the motion. The Court, as it recognized in its August 10th, 2021, order, must evaluate all aspects of the current factual and procedural landscape in considering whether the stay should be lifted or maintained. The FEMA analysis of the first contract appears to have eliminated the need for litigation of certain PREPA objections to Cobra's costs under the first contract, and that review was comprehensive.

The FEMA administrative review process allows for a targeted investigation into potentially disputed expenses and an avenue for administrative appeal for any adverse finding, and so although FEMA is not a party to the contract, the FEMA process, which turns on similar issues as Bankruptcy Code and contractual entitlement to payment of Cobra, is one that reduces the need for extensive litigation and discovery proceedings to resolve disputes regarding the amounts billed, and is an important factor in conserving court resources and the resources of the parties.

The Court understands that the plaintiff, Cobra -well, the movant, Cobra, has an interest in expeditious
determination of its ultimate entitlement to payment of its
invoices. That is an important consideration. It is not a
determinative consideration.

PREPA here and the Court would face what would be potentially and probably unnecessary use of resources, and

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potentially conflicting outcomes if the entitlements to payment under the second contract were litigated prior to the FEMA determination, and the public interest in this particular setting of a Title III bankruptcy is one that the public entity defendant has presumably also weighed in determination as to the risks and benefits of expending public resources on potentially unnecessary and potentially duplicative litigation of this particular claim.

The Court finds that the delay of determination outcome here is not clearly inconsistent with the public interest in the context of this particular controversy, and the Court also notes that the prejudice being suffered by Cobra isn't materially different from that of others who are awaiting payments of administrative expense claims.

Accordingly, the Court will enter an appropriate order denying the motion, and the parties are directed to file a further status report by January 6th, 2023, or, if earlier, 30 days following the issuance of a FEMA determination concerning the second contract.

Thank you. Thank you, Counsel, for your arguments and submissions.

MR. COOPER: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: The final contested matter is No. 4 on the agenda, the PV Properties Motion for Relief from Stay, which is Docket Entry No. 2779 in Case No. 17-4780, and I have

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     counsel for the movant, PV Properties, down for opening
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     remarks of four minutes.
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              Would counsel for PV Properties please turn on your
     camera and your microphone?
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              MR. AGRAIT: Good morning, Your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Good morning, Mr. Agrait.
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              MR. AGRAIT: For PV Properties, Attorney Fernando
     Agrait.
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              Your Honor, we are here today because 12 years ago,
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     2010, a new asset was created by the government of Puerto
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     Rico. The asset was the RECs -- renewable energy
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     certificates, and it is --
              COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry, Counsel. This is the
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     court reporter. If you could repeat? The audio broke off.
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     "The asset was the" -- it broke off.
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              MR. AGRAIT: The renewable energy certificate.
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              THE COURT: So that's renewable energy certificate,
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     which you are referring to as the REC, R-E-C; is that correct?
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              MR. AGRAIT: An asset. Yes.
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              THE COURT: The RECs are an asset. Thank you.
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              Did you get that, madam court reporter?
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              COURT REPORTER: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you.
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              THE COURT:
                          Thank you.
              Please continue, Mr. Agrait.
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              MR. AGRAIT: The asset was created as an instrument
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of public policy to increase the investment, financing, and promotion of renewable energy providers by the private sector. The RECs' asset value depends both on the market and/or specific private negotiations between parties, or with PREPA. That -- and the reason and the key for the RECs' value is that PREPA, a public monopoly, must comply with Puerto Rico law, with the renewable portfolio standard, meaning a certain amount of renewable energy has to be part of its portfolio of production.

The only way that PREPA can comply with the RPS is either by self production, that they don't have capacity as a matter of fact, by buying renewable energy and RECs from private producers, that there are not enough in Puerto Rico to provide what they need for the RPS, or by buying RECs.

What is happening is that PREPA is notifying the public agency, which is the PREB, on its compliance with the renewable portfolio standard and its actions. The RECs, that is acquired from people, entities that have PPOAs with PREPA, but it's also adding the renewable energy production of private consumers who have --

(Sound played.)

MR. AGRAIT: -- net metering programs with PREPA.

And none of the RECs of the net metering consumers are
acquired by PREPA. The net effect is that if PREPA can comply
with the RPS by using renewable energy that it has not

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acquired, the RECs, like it is informing now the PREB, the end result is the RECs lose all their value. It just disappears, because, as I mentioned, the reason for the value of the RECs is that PREPA must comply and must buy in order to add their own self-production, or PPOA acquired RECs.

THE COURT: Mr. Agrait, in my June 17th order, I directed the parties to provide specific citations to language in the reports to PREB that show that PREPA is, in fact, claiming that it is in compliance with the RPS, but the documents that we have here seem to indicate that PREPA is not claiming that it's in compliance. It's reporting substantially lower amounts than would be required to meet the RPS target.

So what is your -- what's the basis of your claim that PREPA is saying that it's in compliance?

MR. AGRAIT: I might have made a mistake in an expression of mine, saying that they are claiming that they are in compliance. They have to file the reports in order to show the PREB, Puerto Rico Energy Bureau, whether they are in compliance or not, and there they present as amount of renewable energy to be taken into account for their compliance, both PPOAs, RECs, and energy by the -- the super energy consumers with net metering programs that they don't acquire the RECs, and the RECs are not paid to these consumers. So the total they are presenting, even the very

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low total they are presenting, includes energy produced by private consumers where they have not acquired the RECs.

So they -- noncompliance is worse than what they report, and they have a legal obligation to comply. Whether it's the Puerto Rico Energy Bureau or some other entity that has to impose sanctions on them for not doing so, but the fact is that they are including, as information of renewable energy to be taken into account for compliance, energy from the civil generators that -- generators that have not -- that they haven't purchased the RECs.

THE COURT: Now, there are other renewable energy suppliers in Puerto Rico. Is there any reason why the RECs would have to have been bought from PV Properties in particular?

MR. AGRAIT: Well, two things. One, there are not enough producers of renewable energy in Puerto Rico, PPOAs, to comply with PREPA'S RPS obligations under the law. That's one. So in order to move toward compliance, they must buy all the RECs available from PPOA contracts, and buy PPOA RECs from private producers, like the case of the net metering consumers. That's one. And, two -- and PV Properties have production of renewable energy with net metering contracts for the RECs. We are actually doing that and not receiving -- not being bought on the RECs. That is the main reason. And, two, whether other parties claim their rights to this Court, well,

it's their decision. We are claiming ours.

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We are not here in a class action representing all the PPOA producers or all the consumers with net metering programs. We're just requesting our rights, where we have an asset that value collapses to zero when PREPA claims that it's moving to compliance with energy -- renewable energy portfolio standard without acquiring the RECs.

THE COURT: And what -- even if you are correct that PREPA's actions that you have described would support nondischargeable takings claims, what harm would you suffer if the Court does not grant immediate stay relief? Can't the dischargeability arguments be addressed equally well later in connection with a claim or plan confirmation proceedings?

MR. AGRAIT: Yes, Your Honor, I think that our claims could be taken care of later in -- in the bankruptcy proceedings, yes.

THE COURT: Do you have any specific response to the Oversight Board's analysis of the *Sonnax* factors, in which the Oversight Board argues that those factors do not indicate a need for immediate stay relief?

MR. AGRAIT: Well, Your Honor, I think that certainly there is a harm to PREPA -- or to the movant here of not having the value of its assets protected and paid for. And there is no -- I don't think that PREPA can argue that it suffers a harm, because it has to comply with the law. I

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mean, PREPA, it's a public entity, and it can only act within the framework of the law that it operates. And arguing that they would be harmed by complying with the law makes no sense in a public entity. So I think that the -- the balance, the Sonnax factors would go in favor of raising the --COURT REPORTER: I'm sorry, Counsel. Thank you. I'm sorry. THE COURT: COURT REPORTER: Your Honor, I'm sorry. This is the court reporter. If counsel could repeat the very last part of his sentence? It dropped off, the audio --THE COURT: So, Mr. Agrait, would you repeat your last point there? Instead of concerning the harm to PREPA, MR. AGRAIT: to the debtor, I don't think it's reasonable for PREPA to say that it will suffer harm because it has to comply with the law. PREPA is a public entity, and all its actions must comply with the law. There's no space outside of the law. The law created it, and -- the structure and framework of renewable energy that the Government of Puerto Rico created by law. So, in the balance, the harm suffered by PV versus the harm, quote, unquote, suffered by PREPA remains in favor of PV. THE COURT: Madam court reporter, were you able to

get that this time? 1 2 COURT REPORTER: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you. THE COURT: Thank you. 3 So now I will turn to counsel for the Oversight 4 Board, Mr. Desatnik. Good morning. 5 MR. DESATNIK: Good morning, Your Honor. Daniel 6 7 Desatnik, Proskauer Rose, LLP, for the Oversight Board, as Title III representative of PREPA. 8 THE COURT: Good morning. 9 MR. DESATNIK: Your Honor, this is movant's third 10 attempt to lift the stay to compel PREPA to buy its RECs. The 11 Court denied movant's prior two attempts for failure to show 12 cause on Sonnax factors grounds. That is the legally relevant 13 test. 14 As Your Honor just asked movant, what is the harm 15 from adjudicating your claim in the claims administration 16 process like everyone else? I don't want to overstate what 17 movant said, but I believe he just told the Court there is no 18 harm, there is no reason why movant cannot adjudicate its 19 claim, if it believes it's a takings claim and is not 20 dischargeable. PREPA obviously disagrees, but that's really 21 the crux of the issue, and we believe that that is dispositive 22 of the motion. 2.3 The Court denied movant's past two lift stays on 2.4 Sonnax factors grounds, and we believe its reasoning in those 25

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two motions -- in the denial of those two motions is equally applicable here. Movant did say that PREPA would not be harmed by lifting the stay. We disagree for much of the same reasons that the Court just articulated in the Cobra stay motion.

As the Court is well aware, PREPA is in the midst of global mediation with key stakeholders. The Court just declined an invitation from some of those mediation parties to proceed with litigation while mediation is ongoing. The Court also just recognized that maintaining the stay is in the public interest, because it weighs in favor of not potentially engaging in unnecessary litigation.

Judge, we don't believe that PREPA should have to divert its limited resources at this critical juncture to engage in litigation, particularly litigation on a claim that is not commenced. Your Honor, because Your Honor asked for supplemental briefing, even though we maintain that the merits of the underlying claim here are not relevant on a lift stay motion, all that is relevant is whether movant has shown cause to lift the stay, and they have not, I do want to briefly address some of the factual contentions of movant's motion.

Movant's takings claim is entirely built on its contention that PREPA has reported to PREB that it owns movant's RECs in order to comply with the RPS. Based on my review of the client's reports and my discussions with PREPA's

counsel, that simply is not the case.

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As shown in the joint status report that we submitted, PREPA does not take credit for RECs from distributed generation providers such as PV Properties.

Movant actually concedes as much in the joint status report, saying that there's nowhere in the report that it expressly takes credit. It further does not explain how those reports take credit for those RECs by implication.

Second, Judge, as you yourself noted, PREPA is not claiming compliance with the RPS. Unfortunately, PREPA is quite far from compliance. My understanding is, in its latest report, it is only 3.7 percent of the way to the 20 percent compliance threshold, and that, again, it is my understanding, is a bright-line requirement. It doesn't matter if PREPA is 3.7 percent or maybe 3.8 percent, because now it has movant's RECs. If it fails to meet that 20 percent threshold, PREB issues a noncompliance notice, and then PREPA must show that noncompliance was excusable for one of seven reasons.

If PREPA's able to meet that standard, there's really no benefit to PREPA from not complying or punishment to PREPA, and so there's really no prejudice to movant here from not engaging in the sale of the RECs at this moment in time.

Third, Judge, for the same reason, this motion is premature because PREB has yet to regulate the market for RECs. We cover this extensively in our brief, but PREB needs

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to set the minimum price for RECs, and PREPA has determined that it cannot engage in the purchase of RECs from distributed generation providers such as PV Properties until that has been done.

Movant actually quotes a letter that PREPA sent to Windmar, which is an affiliate of PV Properties, in which PREPA says, once PREB has passed those regulations, PREPA will engage with it in potentially buying its RECs. And given that PREPA is so far from its compliance standards, there is a likelihood here that that conversation will need to take place. So going back to the Court's observation in the Cobra matter, that we want to avoid unnecessary litigation, this could be rendered unnecessary as well in due time.

Finally, Judge, for the same reason, you know, even if the factual contentions were true, and my view is that they are not, there's no per se taking of property here.

(Sound played.)

MR. DESATNIK: Movant retains title to its RECs.

It's free to sell or trade them once the regulations have been passed by PREB. There's also no regulatory taking against PREPA, because PREB is the relevant regulator, and PREPA has not passed any regulation that would deprive movant of the value of its RECs.

So unless Your Honor has any questions, we respectfully submit that the Court should deny the Lift Stay

1 Motion. Thank you. 2 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Desatnik. Anything further, Mr. Agrait? 3 MR. AGRAIT: Yes. Very short. 4 First, the Law 17 of 2019, which is the public policy 5 in Puerto Rico --6 7 I'm sorry. After -- would you go back THE COURT: and repeat what you said after the reference to Law 17 of 8 2019? The sound didn't come through. 9 MR. AGRAIT: The Law 17, Law 17 of 2019 is Puerto 10 Rico's public policy, Your Honor. It specifically states that 11 the obligations of the government parties is not subject, nor 12 limited, nor can be pro -- pending on the regulations are 13 approved. Such is the law, and that law applies to PREPA. So 14 PREPA saying that they don't have to act because there's no 15 regulations is simply against the law and is incorrect. 16 That's my -- two --17 I'm sorry, Counsel. This is the COURT REPORTER: 18 court reporter. Against the law and -- I didn't hear the last 19 part --20 MR. AGRAIT: And incorrect. And incorrect. So if 21 PREPA reports to the PREB only the RECs they have acquired 22 2.3 from PPOA contracts, which they do in their report, and don't add to those numbers the energy -- renewable energy produced 2.4 25 by consumers who have not been paid for the RECs, then there

would be no problem.

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The issue here, different from the prior cases that PV Properties and Windmar brought to this Court concerning the RECs, is that we are arguing that by reporting to the PREB the value -- the value of the energy that they don't pay for the RECs, they are, one, misleading a government agency and submitting wrong information; and, two, the net effect is to eliminate the value of the RECs, because the RECs have value only when PREPA has to buy them in order to comply with the RPS.

That will be all, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Agrait, and thank you also, Mr. Desatnik, for your arguments. I will now make my ruling.

Before the Court is PV Properties, Inc.'s, Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay, which is Docket Entry No. 2779 in Case No. 17-4780. I'll refer to that as the "Motion". The Court has carefully reviewed the relevant pleadings, and listened to the arguments today. The Court now makes its oral ruling as to the Motion, and reserves the right to make nonsubstantive corrections in the transcript of this ruling.

For the reasons that follow, the Court denies the motion to the extent that the automatic stay bars the prosecution of the movant's claims. This reminds me that there is a question that I had intended to put to

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Mr. Desatnik, and so I'm going to ask Mr. Desatnik to return to camera for a moment.

Mr. Desatnik, is it the Oversight -- is it PREPA's position that the automatic stay bars PV Properties from seeking relief with respect to post-petition RECs, and, if so, on what aspect of Section 362 is that position premised?

MR. DESATNIK: Yes, Your Honor. I don't want to overstate the Board's position on the automatic stay, but from my analysis, 362(a)(3) stays any act to obtain possession of property of the estate, or property from the estate, or to exercise control over property of the estate.

As the Court is aware, under PROMESA 301, property of the estate is substituted for property of the debtor. So if PV Properties is trying to commence an action against PREPA to collect on a judgment against PREPA, at this point in time, they are committing an act to exercise control over PREPA's property, meaning its funds.

So we do believe, or at least, you know, my analysis -- and I don't want to overcommit the Board's position on this -- is that the stay would apply here to the post-petition RECs. But I also do want to say that I'm not sure if the post-petition/pre-petition lens is correct here, because this is just the same continuation of PV Properties' claims that existed pre-petition. They're saying that they have RECs. They're saying that, Puerto Rico law complies us to buy those

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RECs -- compels PREPA to buy those RECs. And now it's just a change of theory. Now they're saying that the Court's decided Puerto Rico law does not require us to buy those RECs. Now it's a takings claim.

So I do think that this is just a different theory of a pre-petition claim, but even to the extent there might be some post-petition element, the stay would still apply.

THE COURT: But there is no judgment that they're trying to collect now. What they're talking about is instituting an inverse condemnation action that would result in the first instance in a determination as to whether there is liability. Is that correct?

MR. DESATNIK: Well, they say that in their motion, Your Honor, but the order that they proposed does not have such qualification, so it's unclear to us if this is just a quantification, or if it's to seek a judgment.

I would, you know, still take the position that even a quantification that seeks to reserve a portion of PREPA's property for it is still an act to control PREPA's property, but, nevertheless, if the stay does apply, if they're just seeking quantification purposes of their claim, there's no reason that it can't be done in the claims administration process.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Desatnik.

So now I will go on with my ruling. For the reasons

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that follow, the Court denies the Motion to the extent that the automatic stay bars the prosecution of the movant's claims. To determine whether cause exists to lift the automatic stay, the Court analyzes the factors set out by the Second Circuit in Sonnax Industries v. Tri Component Products, Corp., in the In re: Sonnax Industries bankruptcy case, 907 F.2d 1280, 1286 (2nd Cir. 1990). See Gracia-Gracia v. Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico in the In re: Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico, Title III case, 939 F.3d 340, 347 (1st Cir. 2019).

The following factors identified in *Sonnax* are particularly relevant to this controversy: Whether relief would result in a partial or complete resolution of the issues. That is the first factor. Connection with or interference with the bankruptcy case. That is the second factor. The interest of judicial economy, and the expeditious and economical resolution of litigation. That is the 10th factor. Whether the parties are ready for trial. That is the 11th factor. And the impact of the stay on the parties and the balance of harms, which is the 12th factor.

The party requesting stay relief bears the initial burden of establishing prima facie eligibility for stay relief, after which the debtor has the ultimate burden of persuasion on all issues other than the debtor's equity in property, and I cite for that the *Gracia-Gracia* decision,

which quoted Sonnax.

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The first factor does not weigh in favor of lifting the automatic stay. Granting the motion and providing relief from the automatic stay so that PV Properties can commence an inverse condemnation proceeding against PREPA would not result in the resolution of issues that will speed the resolution of PREPA's Title III case. While PV Properties would like its claims to be adjudicated by a court sooner rather than later, that is no doubt true of many creditors who would like their claims to be resolved and paid as soon as possible.

The fact that PV Properties has cast its claims as arising under the Takings Clause does not make their immediate resolution more pressing. As the Court has previously held, granting stay relief simply because a movant has asserted constitutionally protected rights would invite unsecured creditors to seek to challenge in alternative fora the validity of any government act that they contend has affected their rights by simply recasting their claim in constitutional terms, thereby disrupting significantly and undermining the fundamental purpose of these Title III proceedings. In re:

Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico, 485

F. Supp. 3d 351, 362 (D.P.R. 2020), affirmed 989 F.3d 170, (1st Cir. 2021).

Moreover, even if PV Properties' claims have merit, so do many creditors' claims. If the mere existence of

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meritorious claims constituted cause for relief from the automatic stay, the automatic stay would cease to provide the breathing spell that is critical to debtors' rehabilitation.

In re: Oversight -- Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico, Case No. 17-3283, reported at 2019 Westlaw 4735362, at \*4, (D.P.R. June 28th, 2019).

Granting stay relief would, however, divert PREPA's resources and attention during a period when its employees and advisors are focused on the critical task of negotiating and formulating a plan of adjustment with the aid of the mediation team. Permitting PV Properties to circumvent the orderly claims resolution process and distract from efforts to formulate a plan for the benefit of all stakeholders is potentially prejudicial to other interested parties, and is not an efficient use of the debtors' resources. Thus, the second factor also weighs against stay relief. Nor do factors ten and 11 support stay relief. The inverse condemnation proceeding contemplated by PV Properties has not even been commenced, and, therefore, is not ready for trial.

Accordingly, the Court is not inclined to require PREPA to take on the significant transaction costs of trying to untangle the factual and legal basis for PV Properties' claims, and to respond to them in another judicial forum at this time. For these reasons, the Court will enter an order denying the motion.

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Thank you, Counsel, for your arguments and your appearance today. This concludes the matter. MR. AGRAIT: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Mr. Agrait? I'm sorry, Mr. Agrait. Did you want to --MR. AGRAIT: I just said thank you, Your Honor. Thank you. THE COURT: Take care. So this concludes the scheduled agenda matters. counsel need to raise anything else before I adjourn, please raise your hand on the screen. I do not see any hands raised, so this concludes the hearing agenda for this Omnibus Hearing. The next scheduled hearing is the August 8th, 2022, pretrial conference in connection with the proposed Plan of Adjustment for the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority. As with today's hearing, that hearing will occur over a combination of Zoom and a listen-only telephone line. The Court previously entered an Order adjourning the August 10th Omnibus Hearing, so that Omnibus Hearing is now scheduled to be held in conjunction with the Confirmation Hearing to be held the following week on August 17th and 18th, 2022. I expect to conduct the August 17th and 18th hearings in San Juan, conditions permitting. As always, I thank our court staff in Puerto Rico, in Boston, and in New York for their work in managing today's

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proceedings, and their ongoing work in managing and
administering these very complex proceedings under
circumstances that continue to be challenging. Stay safe and
keep well everyone. We are now adjourned.
         (At 11:12 AM, proceedings concluded.)
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U.S. DISTRICT COURT
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     DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO)
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          I certify that this transcript consisting of 61 pages is
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 5
     a true and accurate transcription to the best of my ability of
 6
     the proceedings in this case before the Honorable United
 7
     States District Court Judge Laura Taylor Swain, and the
     Honorable United States Magistrate Judge Judith Gail Dein on
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     June 29, 2022.
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